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   Preliminary	   ideas	   in	   this	   paper	  were	  presented	   at	   the	  2015	  meeting	  of	   the	  Asociación	  Argentina	  de	  
Economía	  Política,	  Province	  of	  Salta.	  We	  are	  grateful	  to	  comments	  received	  at	  the	  meeting	  but	  we	  remain	  
solely	  responsible	  for	  the	  contents	  of	  this	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  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Journal	  of	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Rents,	  “infant	  industry”	  and	  contingent	  protection	  policies:	  gains	  and	  
losses	  for	  Argentina’s	  biodiesel	  industry	  
Julio	  Nogués	  and	  Ernesto	  A.	  O’Connor	  
Resumen	  	  
A	   partir	   de	   2007	   la	   industria	   del	   biodiesel	   comenzó	   a	   crecer	   rápidamente	   como	   una	  
alternativa	   para	   exportar	   el	   creciente	   volumen	   de	   soja	   producida	   en	   el	   país.	   En	   respuesta	   a	  
políticas	  de	  subsidio	  claramente	  inclinadas	  hacia	  las	  ventas	  al	  exterior,	  durante	  los	  primeros	  años	  
la	  mayor	  parte	  de	   la	  producción	  de	  biodiesel	   se	  exportaba.	  Pero	  esos	   incentivos	  pusieron	  en	  
riesgo	  la	  inversión	  cuando	  la	  UE	  impuso	  medidas	  antidumping.	  Desde	  entonces,	  las	  políticas	  se	  
han	  inclinado	  hacia	  las	  ventas	  al	  mercado	  interno	  como	  una	  forma	  de	  disminuir	  los	  riesgos	  en	  el	  
mercado	   externo.	   Sin	   embargo,	   este	   mercado	   también	   está	   regulado	   por	   el	   gobierno	   con	  
decisiones	  que	  no	  siempre	  favorecen	   la	   industria.	  El	  artículo	  estima	   las	  rentas	  proteccionistas	  
recibidas	  por	   la	   industria	   tanto	  a	   través	  de	   las	   exportaciones	   como	  de	   las	   ventas	   al	  mercado	  
interno.	  También	  se	  discuten	   los	   riesgos	  en	  el	  mercado	   internacional	  asociados	  a	  políticas	  de	  
susidio	  a	  las	  exportaciones.	  
Abstract	  	  
Since	   2007	   and	   in	   response	   to	   nascent	   legislation	   providing	   subsidies,	   Argentina’s	  
biodiesel	  industry	  started	  growing	  fast.	  The	  legislation	  was	  approved	  on	  the	  target	  idea	  that	  the	  
economy	   should	   diversify	   away	   from	   exporting	   primary	   products,	   and	   shifting	   to	   higher	  
processing	   stages	   in	   this	   case,	   shifting	   from	   soybeans	   to	   soybean	   oil	   and	   biodiesel.	   Initially,	  
responding	  to	  these	  policies	  clearly	  tilted	  towards	  foreign	  sales,	  most	  of	  the	  output	  was	  exported.	  
Nevertheless,	  these	  export	  subsidies	  put	  investment	  at	  risk	  when	  the	  EU	  imposed	  antidumping	  
measures.	  More	  recently,	  policies	  have	  been	  tilted	  towards	  sales	  in	  the	  domestic	  market	  but	  at	  
the	  cost	  of	  government	  controlled	  biodiesel	  prices.	  The	  paper	  offers	  estimates	  of	  protectionist	  
rents	  (subsidies)	  received	  by	  the	  industry	  from	  export	  sales,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  sales	  in	  the	  domestic	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1.   Introduction	  
Argentina	  has	  a	  long	  tradition	  of	  promoting	  industrialization	  with	  high	  and	  discretionary	  
import	  barriers	  that	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  rent	  seeking	  activities.	  This	   industrial	  promotion	  policy	  
has	   frequently	   been	   accompanied	   with	   a	   strong	   discrimination	   against	   agriculture	   and	   as	   a	  
consequence,	  for	  most	  of	  the	  last	  eighty	  years,	  the	  rate	  of	  the	  country’s	  per	  capita	  GDP	  growth	  
has	  lagged	  well	  behind	  comparator	  countries4.	  
Since	  2002,	  and	  after	  a	  decade	  when	  the	  country	  attempted	  to	   implement	  more	  open	  
trade	  policies	  than	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  government	  has	  once	  again	  implemented	  highly	  protectionist	  
policies	   with	   the	   goal	   of	   deepening	   industrialization	   by	   resorting	   to	   trade	   policies	   that	   have	  
violated	  a	  great	  number	  of	  WTO	  rules	  (Baracat	  and	  others	  2013)5	  These	  broken	  rules	  apply	  to	  
imports	  but	  not	  to	  agricultural	  export	  policies	  that	  in	  fact	  the	  WTO	  does	  not	  regulate	  (ICSID	  2014).	  
The	   discretion	   that	   the	   Government	   has	   to	   decide	   the	   height	   and	   policy	   composition	   of	  
agricultural	  export	  barriers	  also	  creates	  opportunities	  for	  rent	  seeking	  activities.	  
Since	   2003	   this	   discretion	   has	   been	   used	   intensively	   to	   set	   very	   high	   export	   barriers	  
against	  primary	  agricultural	  producers.	  Under	  this	  setting,	  several	  agro	  industries	  have	  benefited	  
from	   low	  prices	  of	  primary	   inputs	   such	  as	  wheat	  mills,	   animal	   feed	  and	  chicken	  meat	  among	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4
	  Several	  studies	  have	  addressed	  the	   long	  run	  price	  discrimination	  against	  agriculture	   including	  among	  
others	  Colome	  et.	  al.	   (2011),	  Díaz	  Alejandro	  (1975),	  Nogués	  (2011),	  Reca	  (1980)	  and	  Sturzenegger	  and	  
Salazni	   (2007).	   Diaz	   Alejandro	   and	   Nogués	   rely	   heavily	   on	   insights	   from	   the	   theory	   of	   comparative	  
advantage.	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  A	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  import	  barriers	  and	  foreign	  exchange	  controls	  implemented	  since	  around	  2003	  in	  
violation	  of	  WTO	  rules	  is	  presented	  in	  Baracat	  et.	  al	  (2013).	  These	  barriers	  led	  several	  countries	  to	  dispute	  
them	   in	   the	  WTO	  and	   the	  Panel	   established	  by	   its	  Dispute	   Settlement	  Body	  has	   found	   the	   country	   in	  








others.	  For	  example,	  while	  the	  export	  tax	  on	  chicken	  meat	  is	  5%,	  the	  export	  barrier	  on	  maize	  is	  
approximately	  equivalent	  to	  35%	  implying	  a	  25%	  subsidy6.	  
The	  biodiesel	  industry	  was	  born	  and	  initially	  grew	  rapidly	  by	  the	  Government’s	  tuning	  of	  
these	  export	  barriers.	  The	  idea	  has	  been	  to	  develop	  an	  “infant	  industry”	  that	  adds	  value	  to	  the	  
50	  to	  55	  million	  tons	  of	  soybeans	  produced	  annually	  by	  the	  country.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  
to	   illustrate	   how	   under	   subsidy	   policies,	   this	   industry	   grew	   rapidly	   through	   sales	   in	   the	  
international	  market.	  
The	  rest	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  Section	  2	  provides	  a	  summary	  overview	  of	  
the	  rise	  and	  decline	  of	   this	   industry.	  Section	  3	  analyzes	   the	  vulnerability	  of	  export	  promotion	  
policies	  to	  existing	  WTO	  rules	  for	  contingent	  protection.	  Section	  4	  explains	  the	  changing	  nature	  
of	  policy	  instruments	  and	  their	  short	  run	  impacts	  on	  the	  industry’s	  production	  levels	  since	  the	  EU	  
applied	  an	  antidumping	  measure	  (AD)	  against	  biodiesel	  imports	  from	  Argentina	  (and	  Indonesia).	  
Section	  5	  quantifies	   the	  magnitude	  of	   rents	   from	  export	  promotion	  policies	   and	   from	  official	  
biodiesel	  prices	  in	  domestic	  sales.	  Section	  6	  presents	  the	  concluding	  remarks.	  
2.   Triggering	  the	  rise	  and	  containing	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  biodiesel	  industry	  (2007-­‐2015)	  
Biodiesel	   is	   an	   alternative	   fuel	   produced	   from	   domestic	   renewable	   resources	   such	   as	  
soybean	   oil	   that	   can	   be	   mixed	   with	   petroleum	   diesel	   to	   achieve	   a	   blend	   used	   in	   internal	  
combustion	   engines	   (diesel).	   Biodiesel	   has	   environmental	   benefits,	   as	   it	   is	   biodegradable,	  
renewable	  and	  non-­‐toxic,	  mostly	  free	  of	  sulfur	  and	  aromatic	  compounds	  potentially	  carcinogenic.	  
It	   reduces	   the	   emission	   of	   hydrocarbons	   and	   carbon	   monoxide	   and	   saves	   CO2	   emissions	  
produced	  by	  fossil	  fuels,	  thus	  reducing	  greenhouse	  gases7.	  
Argentina	   is	   the	   third	   soybean	  producer	   in	   the	  world	  after	   the	  United	  States	   (US)	  and	  
Brazil,	  and	  the	  top	  soybean	  oil	  exporter.	  In	  Argentina	  biodiesel	  is	  made	  mainly	  from	  soybean	  oil	  
so	  developing	  this	  industry	  was	  seen	  by	  private	  interests	  and	  the	  Government	  as	  an	  opportunity	  
to	  process	   increasing	  quantities	  of	  soybean	  domestically.	   In	  2007	  this	   industry	  was	  practically	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  Nogués	  (2015).	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nonexistent	  but	  by	  2011	  it	  had	  become	  the	  fourth	  producer	  and	  the	  leading	  exporter	  of	  biodiesel	  
in	   the	   world.	   This	   initial	   boom	   has	   more	   recently	   receded	   and	   the	   industry	   is	   now	   highly	  
dependent	  on	  domestic	  regulatory	  policies.	  How	  did	  these	  policies	  evolved?	  
Prompted	  by	  private	  interests,	  in	  2006	  the	  government	  decided	  to	  create	  the	  incentives	  
necessary	   to	   attract	   investments	   into	   what	   was	   then	   a	   practically	   a	   non-­‐existent	   biodiesel	  
industry.	  Law	  26.093	  was	  passed	  in	  2006	  and	  shortly	  after,	  its	  regulatory	  decree	  109	  was	  issued	  
in	  2007.	  The	  Secretaría	  de	  Energía	   is	  the	  government	  office	  responsible	  for	  administering	  this	  
legislation.	  This	  Secretaría	  sets	  quality	  and	  technical	  standards	  and	  decides	  the	  cutting	  or	  mixing	  
levels	  of	  biodiesel	  with	  fossil	  fuels.	  The	  Secretaría	  also	  fixes	  the	  domestic	  sale	  price	  of	  biofuels	  
like	  biodiesel	  and	  bioethanol.	  
The	  initial	  takeoff	  of	  the	  industry	  relied	  on	  export	  sales	  that	  were	  supported	  by	  escalated	  
export	   taxes.	   As	   mentioned,	   the	   main	   tradable	   input	   used	   in	   the	   production	   of	   biodiesel	   is	  
soybean	  oil	  that	  since	  2008	  faces	  an	  export	  tax	  of	  32%.	  This	  industry	  in	  turn	  is	  supported	  by	  a	  
35%	  export	  tax	  on	  soybean.	  Soybean	  oil	  and	  biofuels	  are	  certainly	  not	  the	  only	  agro	  industries	  
supported	  by	  escalated	  export	  taxes	  and	  this	  policy	  differentiates	  Argentina	  from	  other	  efficient	  
countries	   like	   Australia	   that	   offer	   free	   trade	   incentives	   to	   its	   agro	   industries.	   Initially	   the	  
government	   implemented	  an	  export	  tax	  on	  biodiesel	  of	  14%	  i.e.	  an	  18	  basis	  points	  difference	  
with	  the	  rate	  on	  soybean	  oil.	  Shortly	  after,	  the	  big	  established	  soybean	  oil	  companies	  like	  Cargill,	  
Molinos,	  Noble,	  Renova	  and	  Vicentin	   initiated	  investments	  that	  expanded	  productive	  capacity	  
rapidly.	   Through	   price	   discrimination,	   the	   government	   has	   also	   promoted	   small	   and	  medium	  
sized	  companies.	  
Table	  1	  shows	  production	  and	  exports	  for	  2009-­‐2014.	  Initially	  as	  mentioned,	  nearly	  all	  of	  
the	  output	  was	  exported	  but	   in	  more	  recent	  years	  this	  share	  has	  declined	  quite	  substantially.	  
Also	  note	  that	  production,	  exports	  and	  the	  export	  to	  output	  ratio	  all	  bottomed	  out	  in	  2013	  when	  





biodiesel	   from	   14%	   to	   22%8	   implemented	   in	   September	   2012,	   that	   reduced	   the	   industry’s	  
profitability	  from	  foreign	  sales.	  Why	  was	  the	  export	  tax	  increased	  so	  unexpectedly?	  















2008	   712,06	   24	   688	   24	   na	  
2009	   1.179,0	   30	   1.149	   97,5	   913	  
2010	   1.814,9	   457	   1.358,4	   74,8	   1.225	  
2011	   2.426,7	   737	   1.681,9	   69,6	   2.088	  
2012	   2.455,1	   897	   1.557,4	   63,5	   1.778	  
2013	   1.997,1	   848	   1.149,2	   57,5	   1.169	  
2014	   2.580,0	   980	   1.500,0	   60,6	   1.394	  
Na:	  notavailable.	  
Source:	   For	   production	   CARBIO	   (Cámara	   Argentina	   de	   Biocombustibles),	   and	   exports	   INDEC	   (Instituto	  
Nacional	  de	  Estadística	  y	  Censos).	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  Decree	  1719/2012	  created	  a	  variable	  export	  tax	  rate	  on	  biodiesel.	  Detailed	  discussion	  of	  these	  policies	  





3.   Contingent	  protection	  against	  the	  biodiesel	  industry	  
As	  mentioned	  by	  2012	  Argentina	  had	  become	  the	  leading	  biodiesel	  exporter	  and	  as	  shown	  
in	  Table	  2,	  Spain	  its	  main	  destination.	  Then	  in	  2013	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  EU’s	  antidumping	  
measure,	  this	  trend	  suddenly	  ended	  and	  exports	  to	  this	  destination	  dropped	  by	  73%	  from	  US$	  
982	  million	  to	  US$	  270	  million	  dollars.	  	  
Table	  2:	  Argentina’s	  biodiesel	  exports	  by	  destination	  (000	  dollars)9	  
Source:	  Trade	  Map.	  
a.   Contingent	  protection	  against	  biodiesel	  imports	  from	  Argentina	  
The	  EU	  and	  Peru	  have	  both	  opened	  contingent	  protection	  investigations	  against	  biodiesel	  
imports	   from	   Argentina	   but	   according	   to	   WTO	   sources,	   Peru’s	   investigation	   is	   still	   being	  
processed10.	   Initially	   the	  EU	  opened	   two	   investigations	   against	  biodiesel	   from	  Argentina	   (and	  
Indonesia):	  an	  antidumping	  on	  August	  29,	  2012	  and	  a	  countervailing	  investigation	  on	  November	  
10,	  2012.	  Although	  eventually	  this	  later	  investigation	  was	  dropped	  it	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  speculate	  
why.	  The	  document	  opening	  the	  EU’s	  countervailing	  investigations	  mentions	  that:	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  Data	  from	  trade	  map	  show	  small	  differences	  with	  INDEC’s	  data.	  
10
	  WTO	  trade	  monitoring	  database:	  www.tmdb.org.	  	  
Country	   2012	   2013	   2014	   2014	  (%)	  
World	   1.774.496	   1.055.429	   1.305.165	   100,0	  
Spain	   982.195	   270.754	   399.016	   30,6	  
USA	   s/d	   387.421	   140.823	   10,8	  
Peru	   184.485	   182.577	   203.830	   15,6	  
UK	   0	   0	   229.326	   17,6	  
Korea	   0	   0	   12.184	   0,9	  
Australia	   0	   24.742	   22.680	   1,7	  
Subtotal	   1.166.680	   865.494	   1.007.859	   77,2	  





“The	   subsidies	   consist	   of	   the	   provision	   of	   inputs	   (soybean	   or	   soybean	   oil	   in	   case	   of	  
Argentina	  and	  palm	  oil	  in	  case	  of	  Indonesia	  whether	  refined	  or	  unrefined)	  at	  below-­‐market	  prices	  
by	  means	  of	  government	  policies	  implemented	  and	  enforced	  by	  a	  policy	  of	  export	  taxes.	  In	  both	  
countries	  concerned	  an	  export	  tax	  is	  charged	  on	  the	  input	  product(s),	  at	  rate(s)	  which	  is/are	  often	  
higher	  than	  that	  charged	  on	  the	  export	  of	  biodiesel.	  This	  approach	  effectively	  obliges	  the	  input	  
producers	  to	  sell	  on	  the	  domestic	  market,	  thus	  creating	  an	  excess	  of	  supply,	  depressing	  prices	  to	  
a	  below-­‐market	  level	  and	  artificially	  reducing	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  biodiesel	  producers.	  It	  is	  alleged	  
that	   the	   above	   schemes	   are	   subsidies	   since	   they	   involve	   a	   financial	   contribution	   from	   the	  
Government	  of	  Argentina	  and	  Indonesia	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  entrustment	  and/or	  direction	  of	  the	  
input	  producers	  to	  provide	  goods	  to	  the	  domestic	  biodiesel	  industry,	  or	  through	  income	  or	  price	  
support)	  and	  confer	  a	  benefit	   to	   the	   recipients	  because	   the	  goods	  are	  provided	   for	   less	   than	  
adequate	  remuneration.	  They	  are	  alleged	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  certain	  enterprises	  producing	  a	  subset	  
of	  products	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector,	  and	  are	  therefore	  specific	  and	  countervailable”	  (European	  
Union2012).	  
There	   is	  no	  doubt	   that	   the	  EU	  was	  behind	   the	  export	   subsidy	   implied	  by	   the	  policy	  of	  
export	   tax	   escalation	   but	   as	   mentioned,	   this	   investigation	   was	   eventually	   closed.	   Why?	  We	  
suspect	   that	   two	   factors	   played	   a	   role.	   First,	   the	   absence	  of	   clear	   enforceable	  WTO	   rules	   on	  
agricultural	  and	  agro	  industrial	  exports	  has	  put	  an	  important	  obstacle	  to	  countervailing	  measures	  
against	   incentive	   policies	   of	   the	   type	   used	   by	   Argentina	   (ICSID	   2014).	   Second,	   given	   that	   on	  
September	  2012	  Argentina	  raised	  the	  export	  tax	  on	  biodiesel	  from	  14%	  to	  22%,	  the	  subsidy	  case	  
against	  Argentina	  lost	  much	  of	  the	  initial	  drama.	  The	  countervailing	  investigation	  we	  suspect,	  is	  
then	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  government	  increased	  the	  export	  tax	  rate	  because	  if	  the	  EU	  would	  had	  
proceeded,	  a	  countervailing	  measure	  would	  had	  set	  a	  risky	  precedent	  for	  other	  agro	  industrial	  
exports.	  Be	  that	  as	  it	  may,	  after	  Argentina	  increased	  its	  export	  tax	  rate,	  the	  EU	  decided	  that	  it	  
was	  sufficient	  for	  its	  purposes	  to	  put	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  compensating	  barrier	  to	  the	  injury	  inflicted	  
on	  its	  biodiesel	  producers	  with	  an	  antidumping	  barrier11.	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  We	   are	   also	   tempted	   to	   speculate	   that	   the	  way	   Argentina	   nationalized	   the	   Spanish	   owned	   Repsol	  
petroleum	  company	  in	  May	  2012	  must	  have	  added	  political	  pressure	  on	  the	  EU	  antidumping	  investigation.	  





As	  mentioned,	  the	  only	  other	  country	  that	  we	  know	  off	   initiating	  a	  countervailing	  case	  
against	   biodiesel	   imports	   from	   Argentina	   is	   Peru	   in	   2014but	   the	   WTO	   database	   is	   not	   yet	  
reporting	   the	   final	   decision12.	   One	   final	   issue	   deserves	   a	   comment.	   Most	   of	   the	   contingent	  
protection	  investigations	  are	  initiated	  by	  countries	  that	  have	  domestic	  producers	  not	  willing	  to	  
adjust	  at	   the	  pace	   required	  by	  a	   sudden	  and	   rapid	  growth	  of	   subsidized	   imports.	  We	  already	  
mentioned	  the	  case	  of	  Spain	  but	  the	  same	  pattern	  occurred	  in	  Peru	  where	  according	  to	  trademap	  
statistics,	  imports	  from	  Argentina	  grew	  from	  nil	  in	  2011	  to	  around	  USD	  180	  million	  in	  2012	  and	  
2013.	  With	  its	  export	  promotion	  policies	  for	  biodiesel,	  the	  government	  of	  Argentina	  appears	  to	  
overlook	  this.	  In	  contrast	  to	  biodiesel,	  since	  2008	  the	  soybean	  oil	  industry	  pays	  a	  32%	  export	  tax	  
while	  the	  tax	  on	  soybeans	   is	  35%	   i.e.	  a	  3%	  differential	  with	  which	  has	  been	  sufficient	   for	  this	  
industry	  to	  expand	  production	  and	  exports	  during	  many	  years.	  At	  the	  light	  of	  this	  experience,	  the	  
biodiesel	   industry	  did	  not	  require	  as	  wide	  a	  difference	   in	  export	  taxes	  between	  soybeans	  and	  
biodiesel	  set	  initially	  by	  the	  government.	  
b.   Policy	  response	  to	  the	  EUs	  AD	  duty	  
Faced	  against	  this	  crisis,	  domestic	  producers	  sought	  to	  compensate	  the	  lost	  export	  market	  
share	  by	  increasing	  the	  cutting	  with	  biodiesel	  and	  diesel	  fuels	  from	  5%	  to	  10%	  in	  February	  2014.	  
More	   recently	   in	   June	  2014	   the	   government	   also	   reduced	   the	  biodiesel	   export	   tax	   rate	   from	  
21,8%	  to	  10,3%	  and	  eventually	  in	  February	  2015,	  to	  8,89%.	  Obviously	  the	  shift	  in	  this	  parameter	  
is	  once	  again	  risking	  the	  initiation	  of	  new	  contingent	  protection	  investigations	  against	  biodiesel	  
exports	  from	  Argentina.	  In	  any	  case,	  these	  policy	  reactions	  appear	  to	  be	  driven	  more	  by	  short	  run	  
requirements	  driven	  by	  lost	  sales	  than	  by	  a	  long	  run	  development	  strategy.	  Therefore,	  through	  
highly	  discretionary	  policies	  that	  exist	  today	  but	  may	  not	  exist	  tomorrow,	  sales	  to	  the	  domestic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
compensation.	  Unlike	  many	  other	  countries,	   the	  EU’s	  AD	  policies	  are	  characterized	  by	  setting	  barriers	  
close	  to	  the	  maximum	  time	  allowed	  by	  the	  WTO	  rules	  (5	  years),	  and	  usually	  by	  the	  full	  dumping	  margin.	  
Generally,	  Latin	  America	  antidumping	  legislation	  is	  quite	  less	  protectionist	  (Finger	  and	  Nogués	  2006).	  	  
12
	  Contingent	  protection	  measures	  in	  Peru	  are	  of	  lesser	  duration	  and	  intensity	  than	  those	  applied	  by	  the	  
EU	  (Finger	  and	  Nogues	  2006).	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  measures	  can	  be	  renewed	  but	  only	  after	  an	  investigation	  
proving	   the	   case.	   It	   should	   also	   be	  mentioned	   that	   Law26.942/2014	   provides	   fiscal	   incentives	   to	   the	  





markets	  have	  increased	  and	  exports	  to	  non-­‐EU	  countries	  are	  also	  growing	  (like	  Korea,	  UK	  and	  
USA	  as	  seen	  in	  Table	  2)13.	  	  
In	  short,	  by	  manipulating	  three	  policy	  parameters	  (export	  taxes	  wedges,	  the	  cutting	  rate	  
of	  diesel	  with	  biodiesel,	  and	  the	  selling	  price	  of	  biodiesel	  to	  the	  domestic	  petroleum	  industry)	  the	  
government	  has	  supported	  the	  industry	  but	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  added	  risks	  from	  possible	  contingent	  
protection	   measures	   in	   some	   destination	   markets.	   These	   policies	   also	   create	   positive	   and	  
negative	  rents	  to	  the	  biodiesel	  industry	  which	  are	  estimated	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
4.   Policy-­‐created	  rents	  for	  the	  biodiesel	  industry	  
The	  policies	  determining	  the	  aggregate	  amount	  of	  rents	  to	  the	  biodiesel	  industry	  are:	  i)	  
the	  export	  tax	  rate	  on	  biodiesel,	  ii)	  the	  export	  tax	  rate	  on	  soybean	  oil,	  (the	  main	  input	  used	  for	  
producing	  biodiesel),	  iii)	  the	  official	  prices	  at	  which	  biodiesel	  enterprises	  are	  required	  to	  sell	  to	  
the	  oil	  refining	  companies	  and,	  iv)	  the	  percent	  of	  cutting	  with	  biodiesel	  required	  in	  diesel	  sold	  to	  
the	   domestic	   market.	   Each	   of	   these	   policy	   parameters	   has	   had	   a	   particular	   impact	   on	   the	  
biodiesel	  industry	  and	  this	  section	  seeks	  to	  quantify	  them.	  
a.   Escalated	  export	  tax	  rates	  
In	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  escalated	  import	  tariffs	  confer	  effective	  protection	  to	  import	  
competing	  industries,	  escalated	  export	  taxes	  with	  rates	  higher	  on	  tradable	   inputs	  than	  on	  the	  
final	  products,	  also	  confer	  effective	  protection.	  We	  will	   label	  “rent”	  to	  the	  dollar	  value	  of	   the	  
effect	  on	  net	  income	  that	  is	  produced	  by	  this	  escalation.	  We	  rely	  on	  the	  following	  equations:	  
Rj=-­‐PIjDj+a1jPIa1jDa1	  	  	  	  (1)	  
ARj=Rj	  x	  Ej	  	  	  (2)	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  At	  the	  international	  level	  it	  should	  be	  mentioned	  that	  the	  US	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  (EPA)	  
approved	   the	   scheme	   of	   traceability	   of	   renewable	   biomass	   (soybean)	   presented	   in	   August	   2012	   that	  







Where	  Rj:	  rent	  per	  ton	  of	  biodiesel	  exports;	  PIj:	  international	  FOB	  price	  of	  biodiesel;	  Dj:	  export	  
tax	   rate	   on	   biodiesel;	   a1j:	   physical	   amount	   of	   soybean	   oil	   necessary	   to	   produce	   a	   a	   ton	   of	  
biodiesel;	  PIa1:	  FOB	  price	  of	  soybean	  oil	  and,	  Da1	  is	  the	  export	  tax	  rate	  on	  soybean	  oil	  and	  Ej	  is	  
tons	  exported.	  
This	   equation	   is	   the	   difference	   between	   revenues	   without	   and	   with	   export	   taxes,	   or	  
between	  free	  trade	  and	  policy-­‐created	  rents.	  The	  first	  term	  on	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  of	  equation	  (1)	  
with	  a	  negative	  sign	  represents	  the	  reduced	  income	  from	  export	  taxes	  on	  biodiesel	  exports	  while	  
the	  second	  term	  with	  a	  positive	  sign	  represents	  the	  savings	  from	  lower	  input	  prices	  determined	  
by	  the	  export	  tax	  on	  soybean	  oil.	  The	  logic	  of	  the	  expression	  is	  as	  follows:	  rents	  from	  exports	  
increase	  the	  lower	  the	  export	  tax	  rate	  on	  biodiesel;	  the	  higher	  the	  physical	  intensity	  of	  the	  low	  
priced	  input	  (a1j),	  and	  the	  higher	  the	  export	  tax	  on	  this	  input.	  
The	  two	  time-­‐invariant	  estimating	  parameters	  of	  this	  equation	  are	  as	  follows:	  
a1j=1,1	  one	  liter	  of	  biodiesel	  requires	  1,1	  liter	  of	  soybean	  oil	  and,	  
Da1:	  32%	  is	  the	  export	  tax	  rate	  on	  soybean	  oil	  that	  has	  not	  changed	  during	  the	  period	  of	  analysis.	  
Table	  3	  presents	   the	  data	  and	  the	  value	  of	   the	  rents	  created	  by	  export	   tax	  escalation.	  
Except	  for	  2013,	  the	  numbers	  in	  the	  last	  column	  shows	  that	  the	  rent	  rate	  ranging	  from	  18%	  to	  
22%,	  has	  been	  quite	  uniform	  during	  this	  period14.	  The	  strong	  decline	  in	  this	  rate	  during	  2013	  is	  
explained	  by	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  export	  tax	  rate	  from	  17%	  in	  2012	  to	  22%.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  
aggregate	  amount	  of	   rents	  determined	  by	   the	   rent	   rate	  and	   the	  value	  exported	   (equation	  2)	  
peaked	  in	  2011	  (USD	  340	  million)	  and	  bottomed	  two	  years	  later	  in	  2013	  (only	  USD	  30	  million)	  as	  
a	   consequence	   of	   the	   increase	   in	   the	   export	   tax	   rate	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   2012,	   and	   the	   EU	  
antidumping	  measure	  that	  essentially	  closed	  the	  European	  market	  to	  Argentina’s	  biodiesel,	  the	  
main	  destination.	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  The	  rent	  rate	  estimated	  for	  biodiesel	  is	  not	  that	  different	  from	  rates	  estimated	  for	  other	  agro	  industries	  
that	  also	  profit	  greatly	  from	  escalation	  of	  export	  taxes	  such	  as:	  wheat	  flower	  (18%);	  chicken	  meat	  (25%)	  
and	  animal	  feed	  (16%).	  Chicken	  meat	  and	  animal	  feed	  are	  also	  sectors	  that	  have	  grown	  rapidly	  in	  recent	  

































2010	   1.068	   914	   14%	   172	   1.358	   234	   21,9	  
2011	   1.608	   1.211	   14%	   201	   1.690	   340	   21,1	  
2012	   1.404	   1.157	   17%	   169	   1.558	   263	   18,7	  
2013	   1.430	   967	   22%	   26	   1.149	   30	   2,1	  
2014	   1.074	   833	   16%	   121	   1.500	   194	   18,1	  
2015(1)	   892	   711	   8%	   179	   na	   na	   na	  
Notes:	  (1)	  average	  January-­‐march;	  (2)	  estimate	  of	  equation	  1	  and,	  (3)	  rent	  per	  ton/FOB	  biodiesel.	  Na:	  
not	  available.	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  based	  on	  data	  from:	  (i)	  FOB	  biodiesel	  prices:	  Biodiesel-­‐National	  Weekly	  Ag	  
Energy	  Roundup,	  USDA-­‐Agricultural	  Marketing	  Service,	  
http://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/lswagenergy.pdf,	  and	  Diesel-­‐U.S.DOE,	  Energy	  Information	  
Administration,	  Monthly	  Retail	  On-­‐Highway	  Diesel	  Prices	  
http://www.eia.gov/oog/info/wohdp/diesel.asp;	  (ii)	  FOB	  soybean	  oil:	  Ministerio	  de	  Agricultura,	  
Argentina	  and,(iii)	  export	  tax	  rates	  on	  biodiesel	  and	  soybean	  oil	  from	  AFIP	  (Adminstración	  Federal	  de	  
Ingresos	  Públicos).	  
Summing	  up,	  the	  biodiesel	  industry	  has	  received	  significant	  rents	  from	  escalated	  export	  
taxes.	   Note	   that	   these	   rents	   are	   fully	   financed	   by	   primary	   producers	   who	   have	   to	   sell	   their	  
primary	   products	  with	   heavy	   discounts	   determined	   by	   export	   barriers	  while	   the	   government	  
simply	  sets	  the	  rates	  discretionally.	  We	  are	  not	  aware	  that	  any	  of	  these	  decisions	  on	  subsidized	  
policies	   has	   been	   supported	   by	   complete	   analyses	   of	   possible	   impacts	   including	   impacts	   on	  
employment	  and	  on	  small	  and	  medium	  sized	  enterprises.	  
What	   is	  not	  that	  clear	  are	  the	  groups	  that	  are	  able	  to	   internalize	  at	   least	  part	  of	  these	  
rents.	  Some	  candidates	  include	  excessive	  wages,	  inland	  transport	  costs	  known	  to	  be	  well	  above	  
those	  prevailing	  in	  neighboring	  countries	  and	  obviously,	  excessive	  profits.	  The	  literature	  has	  also	  
considered	  that	  rents	  may	  also	  be	  paying	  for	  corruptive	  deals	  (Krueger	  1974).	  Are	  there	  other	  
candidates	   that	   may	   be	   appropriating	   these	   rents?	   Yes,	   the	   government	   through	   high	   tax	  
pressure	  on	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  that	  in	  fact	  pays	  for	  the	  rent	  coming	  from	  low	  soybean	  oil	  and	  





b.   Impact	  of	  official	  biodiesel	  prices	  on	  the	  industry’s	  rents	  
As	  mentioned,	   two	   other	   parameters	   determine	   the	   value	   of	   rents	   created	   by	   public	  
biodiesel	  policies:	  1)	  the	  official	  prices	  at	  which	  biodiesel	  enterprises	  are	  required	  to	  sell	  to	  the	  
oil	   refining	   companies	   and,	   2)	   the	   cutting	   of	   biodiesel	  with	   fossil	   diesel	   sold	   to	   the	  domestic	  
market.	  How	  does	  the	  official	  price	  compare	  with	  the	  export	  price	  and	  how	  does	  this	  difference	  
affect	  the	  value	  of	  rents	  received	  by	  the	  biodiesel	   industry?	  In	  answering	  these	  questions,	  we	  
resort	  to	  a	  simple	  expression.	  Let	  FAS	  (free	  along	  ship)	  be	  the	  FOB	  dollar	  price	  per	  ton	  of	  biodiesel	  
net	  of	  any	  formal	  export	  tax	  (D):	  
FAS	  =	  FOB	  x(1-­‐Dj)	  
Then	  price	  difference	  between	  the	  exports	  and	  the	  domestic	  sale	  price	  per	  ton	  can	  be	  expressed	  
as:	  	  
RO	  =	  FAS	  –	  OP	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3)	  
where	   OP	   is	   the	   official	   price	   at	   which	   the	   biodiesel	   industry	   has	   to	   sell	   to	   the	   nationalized	  
petroleum	  industry.	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  rent	  rate	  (%RO)	  is	  defined	  by:	  
%RO	  =	  RO/FOB	  =	  (FAS-­‐OP)/FOB	  (4)	  
The	  following	  table	  shows	  that	  since	  2011	  the	  OP	  has	  been	  set	  below	  the	  FAS	  price	  so	  
since	  then	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  exports,	  the	  biodiesel	  industry	  has	  been	  transferring	  rents	  to	  the	  
petroleum	  industry	  where	  the	  state-­‐owned	  YPF	  enterprise	  holds	  a	  market	  share	  above	  50%.	  





Table	  4:	  International	  and	  domestic	  regulated	  prices	  of	  biodiesel	  (pesos)	  	  










per	  ton	  (RO)	  
2010	   4.059	   14%	   3.491	   3.573	   -­‐82	  
2011	   6.885	   14%	   5.921	   5.040	   882	  
2012	   6.405	   17	  %	   5.318	   4.949	   369	  
2013	   7.825	   22%	   6.123	   5.119	   1.005	  
2014	   8.706	   16%	   7.282	   6.641	   641	  
Source:	   Author’s	   elaboration	   based	   on:	   (i)	   FOB	   biodiesel	   prices:	   Biodiesel-­‐National	  Weekly	   Ag	   Energy	  
Roundup,	   USDA-­‐Agricultural	  Marketing	   Service,	   http://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/lswagenergy.pdf	  
and	   Diesel-­‐U.S.DOE,	   Energy	   Information	   Administration,	   Monthly	   Retail	   On-­‐Highway	   Diesel	   Prices	  
http://www.eia.gov/oog/info/wohdp/diesel.asp;	  (ii)	  export	  tax	  rates	  on	  biodiesel	  and	  soybean	  oil	   from	  
AFIP;	   OP	   regulated	   prices	   informed	   by	   Secretaría	   de	   Energía,	   Unidad	   Ejecutiva	   Interdisciplinaria	   de	  
Monitoreo	  (UEIM).	  We	  have	  used	  the	  simple	  average	  official	  price	  among	  firm	  sizes.	  
Official	  biodiesel	  prices	  (OP)	  are	  set	  quite	  discretionally	  through	  a	  formula	  that	  takes	  into	  
account	  several	  factors	  although	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Energy	  always	  follows	  
it	  strictly	  (Sonnet	  and	  others	  2015).	  Since	  late	  2012,	  OP	  are	  also	  set	  according	  to	  firm	  size	  with	  
the	  biggest	  firms	  receiving	  the	  lowest	  prices.	  In	  the	  above	  table	  we	  use	  average	  OP	  prices	  which	  
understate	  the	  transfer	  of	  rents	  from	  the	  biodiesel	  to	  the	  petroleum	  industry	  as	  big	  firms	  holding	  
the	  bulk	  of	  the	  market	  share	  receive	  the	  lowest	  price.	  For	  example,	  in	  January	  2014	  the	  OP	  set	  
for	  the	  big	  integrated	  firms	  was	  $4,902	  pesos	  per	  ton,	  while	  the	  small	  firms	  holding	  the	  minority	  
share	  of	  sales	  were	  paid	  $6.192	  per	  ton	  (Sonnet	  and	  others	  2014).	  	  
The	  aggregate	  rents	  transferred	  from	  the	  biodiesel	  to	  the	  petroleum	  industry	  are	  easily	  
estimated	  from	  equation	  (4)	  according	  to:	  
ARO=	  ROxDS	  (5)	  	  
where	  DS	  is	  tons	  of	  biodiesel	  sold	  to	  the	  petroleum	  industry.	  The	  following	  table	  offers	  estimates	  
of	  equations	  (4)	  and	  (5):	  
















2010	   -­‐82	   457	   -­‐9,9	   -­‐2,0	  
2011	   882	   737	   151,7	   12,8	  
2012	   369	   897	   72,6	   5,8	  	  
2013	   1.005	   848	   155,7	   12,8	  
2014	   641	   980	   77,5	   7,4	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration:	  (i)	  RO	  from	  Table	  4	  and,	  (ii)	  DS	  from	  Table	  1.	  We	  transform	  pesos	  into	  dollars	  
through	  the	  average	  exchange	  rate	  published	  by	  Banco	  de	  la	  Nación	  Argentina.	  
The	  results	  show	  that	  the	  rents	  transferred	  from	  the	  biodiesel	  to	  the	  petroleum	  industry	  
range	  from	  a	  low	  of	  –USD10	  million	  (a	  subsidized	  price	  to	  biodiesel	  producers)	  in	  2010,	  to	  USD	  
156	  million	   in	  2013.	  As	   shown	   in	  Table	  6,	  over	   the	  years,	   the	  balance	  of	  policy	   created	   rents	  
applied	  to	  the	  biodiesel	  industry	  has	  been	  positive	  and	  quite	  significant.	  
Table	  6:	  Aggregate	  rents	  created	  by	  biodiesel	  policies	  	  
Year	  
Rents	  transferred	  to	  
the	  petroleum	  based	  
industry	  	  
(ARO,	  million	  US$)	  








2010	   -­‐9,9	   234	   243,9	  
2011	   151,7	   340	   188,3	  
2012	   72,6	   263	   190,4	  
2013	   155,7	   30	   -­‐125,7	  
2014	   	  77,5	   194	   116,5	  





5.   Concluding	  remarks	  
For	   most	   of	   the	   last	   eight	   decades,	   commercial	   policies	   in	   Argentina	   have	   been	  
discretionary	  and	  highly	  protectionist.	  Discretion	  has	  prevailed	  over	  rules	  for	  such	  a	  long	  time	  
that	   industrialization	  supported	  by	  protection	  has	  become	  a	  cultural	  value	   irrespective	  of	   the	  
costs	  to	  society.	  Under	  this	  setting	  and	  because	  most	  often	  agro-­‐processing	   industries	  do	  not	  
receive	  import-­‐protection,	  there	  is	  a	  generalized	  belief	  that	  they	  are	  internationally	  competitive.	  
While	  our	  a	  priori	  coincides	  with	  this	  belief,	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  them	  receive	  hidden	  subsidies,	  
puts	   a	   shadow	  of	   doubt	   on	   just	   how	   competitive	   they	  would	   really	   be	   in	   an	   open	   economy.	  
Usually	  these	  subsidies	  are	  hidden	  in	  escalated	  export	  taxes	  and	  given	  that	  primary	  agricultural	  
exports	  are	  heavily	  taxed,	  several	  agro-­‐processing	  industries	  like	  the	  biodiesel	  industry	  buy	  there	  
inputs	  at	  prices	  that	  are	  much	  below	  those	  paid	  by	  the	  same	  industries	  in	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  
tax	  their	  primary	  exports.	  	  
In	  the	  title	  of	  this	  paper	  we	  use	  “infant	  industry”	  not	  to	  refer	  to	  what	  good	  economics	  
may	  justify	  governmental	  assistance,	  but	  simply	  because	  in	  2007	  this	  industry	  was	  non-­‐existent	  
and	  through	  these	  hidden	  subsidies	  (protectionist	  rents),	  the	  biodiesel	  industry	  developed	  like	  a	  
mushroom.	  Under	  an	  open	  economy	  with	  equilibrium	  macroeconomic	  policies,	  more	  reasonable	  
“infant	  industry	  economics”	  would	  have	  set	  some	  form	  of	  time-­‐bound	  assistance	  to	  this	  industry.	  
Unfortunately,	   the	  policy	  environment	   in	  which	  Argentina	   is	  operating	   is	   far	   from	  resembling	  
anything	  close	  to	  good	  policies	  and	  so	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  know	  for	  sure	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  
biodiesel	  industry	  would	  perform	  under	  less	  distorted	  policies.	  	  
In	   short,	   under	   present	   circumstances	   of	   bureaucratic	   discretion	   and	   disequilibrium	  
macroeconomic	   policies,	   the	   industry	   has	   no	   better	   alternatives	   than	   those	   that	   it	   is	   now	  
following	  i.e.	  to	  hang	  on	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  government’s	  policies	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  
lobbying	   intensively	   for	   better	   treatment.	   The	   experience	   we	   review	   suggests	   that	   both	   the	  
government	  and	  the	   industry	  should	  gradually	  move	  away	  from	  subsidies	  hidden	   in	  escalated	  
export	  taxes	  because	  otherwise,	  they	  will	  face	  further	  risks	  in	  international	  markets.	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